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ABSTRACT 
 The transparency of the monetary policymaking process at the Bank of England 
has provided very detailed data on both the votes of individual members of the 
Monetary Policy Committee and the information on which they are based. In this 
paper we consider interval censored responses of individual committee members in 
the context of a model in which inflation forecast targeting is used but there is both 
heterogeneity and interaction among the members of the committee. We find 
substantial heterogeneity in the policy reaction function across members. Further, we 
identify significant interactions between individual decisions of the committee 
members. The nature of these interdependencies inform about information sharing 
and strategic interactions within the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee. 
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1 Introduction
It is widely believed that commitee decisions in the context of monetary pol-
icy decision making have three major benefits . First, a committee can be
used to take personalities out of monetary policy decisions and render the
policy decisions more objective. Second, potential heterogeneity across com-
mittee members provides an opportunity to consider and debate a wide range
of possible policy responses to current and expected future macroeconomic
conditions. Third, committee decisions that evolve through deliberation, de-
bate and information sharing would typically exhibit lower variation in the
path of future inflation and greater social welfare.
These potential benefits of committee decision making is of particular rel-
evance in the context of monetary policy. Empirical evidence strongly high-
lights the role of personalities and individual preferences of central bankers
in the conduct of monetary policy. There is a substantial literature in the US
that uses transcripts of the FOMC to study monetary policymaking. See for
example Belden (1989), Havrilesky and Gildea (1991), Edison and Marquez
(1998) and Chappell et al. (2004). This has provided a number of insights
into how committees work and the role played by individual members, espe-
cially the Chairman. By implication, the literature therefore acknowledges
heterogeneity amongst policy makers within a monetary policy committee.
This body of work has been followed much more recently by studies of the
monetary policymaking process of the Bank of England. In 1992, the United
Kingdom, following New Zealand and Sweden, adopted inflation targeting.
This was augmented by a much more open system of decision-making, but
ultimately decisions on interest rates were still made by the Government.
In 1997 the Bank of England was given full operational independence. To
support this new policy regime, very detailed information about interest rate
decisions has been provided. Recent literature has used such detailed in-
formation, including votes by individual members of the Monetary Policy
Committee, to study several aspects of monetary policymaking at the Bank
of England1. While the above literature provides some evidence on het-
erogeneity across members of a monetary policy committee, there is little
empirical work on understanding either the sources of such heterogeneity or
the nature of interaction between committee members.
1See, for example, Chadha and Nolan (2001), Cobham (2002a, b, 2003), Gerlach-
Kristen (2004), and Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005).
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In the literature, there is some theoretical work highlighting sources of
heterogeneity among policy makers. Backus and Driffill (1985) propose a
model where central bank preferences are uncertain. They consider a a
infinite-horizon world with two types of policy makers; one type is strategic
and maximizes social welfare while the other always chooses zero inflation.
Sibert (2002) considers the situation where policy makers have varying and
uncertain aversion to inflation relative to their dislike for output loss — this is
a source of heterogeneity. Further, when policy makers serve in the commit-
tee for two periods, she shows how strategic behaviour can lead to different
votes in the first and second periods. Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005), on
the other hand, consider a committee setup where there are three distinct
sources of uncertainty. First, committee members may differ about the ef-
fect of interest rates on output and inflation, because of which they obtain
different policy rules. Second, members have access to different private infor-
mation sets which also contributes to heterogeneity in their own policy rules.
Heterogeneity due to these two sources are, however, averaged out through
information sharing and deliberation within the committee. Third, because
of uncertainty regarding the current and future states of the economy, the
members also have different views on the size of the output gap and fore-
casts of inflation. Their empirical study of voting behaviour in the Bank of
England’s Monetary Policy Committee (henceforth, MPC) shows that the
nature of residual heterogeneity is well captured in their differing response
to uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment.
There is also some recent theoretical literature suggesting strategic vot-
ing with monetary policy committees. In Sibert (2003), there are two types
of policy maker. The first is "activist" (or opportunistic) and uses surprise
inflation to signal toughness, while the second type of central banker is mech-
anistic and always votes for zero inflation. She shows that there are incen-
tives for strategic behaviour. A new member will tend to signal toughness
to gain credibility. Further, if the culture or rules of a central bank puts
more weight on senior policy makers, a new member’s incentive to build a
reputation is greater. Inflation-averse members ("doves") find less opportu-
nity for reputation-building as compared with members who vote for higher
interest rates more often ("hawks"). The work of Sibert (2003) provides a
good framework for understanding the strategic behaviour of MPC members
as revealed through their votes. Using residuals from an estimated model
of individual votes that allows for heterogeneity in the effect of uncertainty,
Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005) classify the 19 MPC members as being cau-
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tious or activist (low or high error variance), and as hawks or doves (positive
or negative individual-level fixed effects)2. However, there is little work on
understanding the interdependencies between the decisions of different policy
makers in a committee.
In this paper, we consider a monetary policy committee where person-
alities are important. In our model of committee decision making, the per-
sonalities are reflected in heterogeneity in the policy reaction functions for
the different members, as well as in strategic interactions among members.
We extend the work in Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005) by considering het-
erogeneity in the beliefs about the effects of interest rates on output and
inflation, in the private information of each committee member and in their
differing views on uncertainty. Further, we allow for interaction between the
members of the committee.
As in Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005), our empirical exercise involves esti-
mating policy reaction functions where the response variable (votes) is inter-
val censored. The interval-censored residuals from the estimated individual-
level reaction functions for 5 selectedMPCmembers are then used to estimate
a cross-sectional covariance matrix, using the Expectation-Maximisation (EM)
algorithm. The magnitude and strength of interactions between policy deci-
sions for the 5 MPC members is then assessed using methods for estimating
spatial weights matrices proposed in Bhattacharjee and Jensen-Butler (2005).
The empirical study shows evidence of substantial heterogeneity in in-
dividual policy reaction functions within the Bank of England’s MPC. We
also find significant interdependence between monetary policy decisions of
the different members. The nature of these interdependencies inform about
information sharing and strategic interactions within the Bank of England’s
Monetary Policy Committee.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss our model of
committee decisionmaking within a monetary policy committee. Our empir-
ical model and econometrics are presented in Section 3, and in section 4 we
report our empirical results. Finally, in section 5, we present our conclusions.
2See also King (2002) and Gerlach-Kristen (2004).
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2 Monetary Policy and Committee Decision
Making
In this section, we discuss briefly some simple models of the inflation process
and introduce a role for transparency and for a committee structure for
decision-making and consider the signal extraction problem that the MPC
and its members face individually. The model is broadly similar to Bhat-
tacharjee and Holly (2005), with a modification to allow for inter-member
interactions.
2.1 Inflation forecast targeting and interest rates
We adopt the most simple form of a model of the monetary policymaking
process and abstract from many issues that have been the focus of much of
the recent literature. We do this deliberately in order to have a model that
appears to allign best with how central banks view the monetary transmission
process and to provide a justification for the way in which policy appears to
be conducted.3. The model is structured as follows:
πt = πt−1 + αyt−1 + t (1)
yt = β1yt−1 − β2(it−1 − πt−1) + ηt (2)
πt is the inflation rate in period t, yt is the output gap (the difference
between the log of output and the log of potential output), it is the nominal
interest rate. ηt and εt are iid shocks in period t not observable in period
t− 1. The coefficients α and β2 are positive; β1 (0 < β1 < 1) measures the
degree of persistence in the output gap. The output gap depends negatively
on the real lagged interest rate. The change in inflation depends on the
lagged output gap. The output gap is normalised to zero in the long run.
These pure delays in the impact of the output gap on inflation and of
interest rates on the output gap captures in the most straightforward way
the central bankers’ stylised model of the monetary transmission process.
The modern generation of New Keynesian models with nominal inertia and
imperfect competition still exhibit jumps in output and inflation in response
3In particular, for expositional purposes we ignore forward-looking expectations and
issues arising consequently from time inconsistency.
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to shocks4 which will blur the pure delays embodied in equations (1) and (2).
The intertemporal loss function is:
Lt =
1
2
Et
∞X
τ=t
£
δτ−t
£
(πτ − π∗)2
¤
+ λy2τ
¤
. (3)
Here, Et denotes expectations conditional on information available in period
t. π∗ is the inflation target, and δ is the discount rate (0 < δ < 1). The
policymaker minimises the present discounted value of squared deviations of
inflation from its target and the output gap. λ is the weight the policymaker
attaches to the output gap, with the weight on inflation normalised to unity.
We consider the special case of λ = 0, so the policymaker only targets
inflation, and the central bank can (in expectation) use the current interest
rate to hit the target for inflation two periods hence. So perfect controllability
in this case allows the intertemporal problem to be written as a sequence of
single period problems. In this case (Svensson, 1997)
Lt =
1
2
£
πt+2|t − π∗
¤2
, (4)
where πt+2|t is the forecast of inflation at time period t+2 based on informa-
tion available in period t. The central bank minimises the squared deviation
of the current two-year inflation forecast, πt+2|t, from the target. The forecast
of πt+2 at t is
πt+2|t = πt+1|t + αyt+1|t (5)
and
yt+1|t = β1yt|t − β2(it − πt|t), (6)
where the subscript t|t indicates that current realisations of the output gap
and inflation may well be imperfectly observed, and need to be forecasted.
So:
πt+2|t = α
£
β1yt|t − β2(it − πt|t)
¤
(7)
4See Corrado and Holly (2004) for an example in which inertia comes partly from habit
persistence in household consumption.
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Then the inflation ‘feed forward’ rule is
it = (πt|t − π∗) +
1
αβ2
πt+1|t +
β1
β2
yt|t (8)
This satisfies the Taylor Principle since ∂i/∂π > 1, as long as there is
persistence in inflation. Although an explicit weight is not attached to out-
put losses, current (forecasted) output appears in the rule because the cur-
rent output gap is informative about future inflation. In Svensson’s original
formulation πt|t and yt|t are known. In practice, as Orphanides (1998) has
pointed out, in real time current inflation and the current output gap are
not observed. For expositional purposes we are assuming that the decision
period coincides with the observation period. In practice data are available
at different frequencies from daily to yearly.
2.2 Heterogeneity and committee decision-making
We focus on a strict inflation targeting regime, preference heterogeneity is
not meaningful. Instead we adopt the alternative approach in which hetero-
geneity arises from two different sources: (a) differing views about the state
of the economy, leading do different views about the magnitude of the output
gap, and (b) varying beliefs about the effect of interest rate on inflation and
output gap (αβ2 and β2 respectively). With members subject to these two
forms of heterogeneity, we present a model of committee decision making in
a monetary policy committee. In the next subsection, we consider informa-
tion processing with noisy signals, and consider heterogeneity in the effect of
uncertainty of individual members’ policy reaction functions.
Members come to the committee with different judgments about the state
of the economy5. Each member has the same public information set but aug-
ments this with private information. This can take different forms. An
individual member may dissent from the consensus forecast or an individ-
ual member may have particular expertise that leads to more weight being
attached to particular kinds of information compared to the average. Since
5As King (2002) has pointed out, most of the discussion that takes place among the
MPC members is focused on a technical economic judgment about what it is necessary
to do to hit the inflation target. A sense of this process can be got from the summary of
discussions in each MPC meeting discussed in Cobham (2003). Chadha and Nolan (2001)
examine whether the perceived variation in preferences across MPC members (as revealed
in their votes) is related to volatility in interest rates.
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the internal dynamics of committee decision making can result in a measure
of sharing of expertise (see Geanakoplos, 1992; Bicchieri, 1993), we shall
assume that the decision of each individual member is ultimately based on
commonly shared information as well as private views that cannot be shared
fully with the other members of the MPC, or to which the other members of
the Committee attach varying importance.
Following the growing game theoretic literature on committee decision
making involving issues such as strategic voting, the acquisition of informa-
tion, possible conflicts of interest, and how information is communicated in
committees (see Gerling et al. (2003) for a recent survey), we think of the
decision-making process by the MPC as a two-stage process. In this first
stage there is deliberation about the state of the economy (Gerlach-Kristen,
2003; Meade and Stasavage, 2004), staff economists present conjunctural
analyses of recent events, members share information and views and eventu-
ally a central forecast, with agreed error bands in the form of a fan chart, is
arrived at. Nevertheless, at the second stage, despite this sharing of knowl-
edge many MPC members will choose an interest setting different to the
central estimate.
This process can be cast as a simple signal extraction problem. Once
all public information is revealed and sharable private information of all the
members are exchanged, each committee member formulates her own initial
estimate of the output gap. This estimate is based on xjt , a g × 1 vector
of variables that the j-th MPC member may take notice of (including all
publicly available information, and shared private information contained in
asset and labour market developments, for example), plus private views that
cannot be shared with the rest of the committee. Then the underlying model
is:
yjt = βj.x
j
t+ω
j
t with ω
j
t v N(0, σ2ωj) and E
¡
yjt
¢
= βj.x
j
t = yt, for j = 1, ..m.
(9)
This member-specific initial estimate of the output gap (Equation 9) incor-
porates heterogeneity in the judgments about the state of the economy through
different xjt for different members. Since ω
j
t reflects private views not shared
by other committee members, we would normally expect that E(ωjt .ω
k
t ) = 0,
for j 6= k. However, in case there is strategic interaction between committee
members j and k, ωjt and ω
k
t can be correlated. The j-th variance term σ
2
ωj
captures both objective and subjective confidence in the estimate of yt’s.
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At the end of discussion and deliberation, an agreed estimate, ybt , of the
output gap is agreed upon. This common estimate is a weighted average of
the initial estimates for the m committee members. Therefore, this central
bank estimate is unbiased for the true output gap with
ybt = yt + ω
b
t with ω
b
t v N(0, σ2ωb). (10)
For the j-th member, the final estimate of yt that minimises the forecast
error variance and combines optimally the central bank estimate (ybt ) and the
private estimate (yjt ) is given by:
ydjt = y
b
t + κ
j(yjt − ybt ), (11)
where ydjt is the final decision by the j-th member on what the best estimate of
the output gap is, and κj, is the Kalman gain. This final estimate (Equation
11) shows how members may differ about the size of the output gap, which is
an important source of heterogeneity in our model6.
In addition to heterogeneity in judgments about the state of the economy
and the magnitude of the output gap, committee members may also differ in
their views on the effect of interest rates on inflation and output gap. In the
context of the interest rate model under inflation forecast targeting presented
in the previous subsection, this implies member-specific effects αjβ2j and β2j
respectively. This form of heterogeneity is, in principle, similar to preference
regarding the tradeoff between inflation and output loss (as in Sibert, 2002)
in the general form of the policy maker’s loss function (Equation 3).
Under the model of committee decision making presented above, and
given the two types of heterogeneity, the decision rule for the j-th member
can now be written as:
ijt = (πt|t − π∗) +
1
αjβ2j
πt+1|t +
β1
β2j
yt|t + ςjt for j = 1, ...,m, (12)
where
yt|t = ybt = βj.x
j
t + ω
j
t
6In the discussion of differering views of the MPC members in the September 2006
meeting of the MPC (Bank of England, 2006), there is explicit acknowledgement that
different members place different weights on the same macroeconomic events and implicitly
also that they may hold different views on the magnitude of the output gap.
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is the central bank estimate (or forecast) of current output gap and
ςjt =
β1
β2j
.κj.(yjt − yt|t)
represents the effect of the deviation¡
yjt − yt|t
¢
=
¡
ωjt − ωbt
¢
of the j-th member’s initial estimate of output gap from the common esti-
mate.
Two important points must be noted regarding the nature of the ςjt’s. First,
ςjt need not be a zero mean process and in general captures the extent to
which the j-th member deviates from the central interest rate projection that
is implied by the central bank forecast. Hence, ςjt can be expressed in fixed
effects form as
ςjt = φj + γjt,
where the γjt’s are zero mean random errors.
Second, ςjt’s are uncorrelated across different meetings for the same policy
maker, but are correlated across members of the committee. This is because:
(a) they are related to each other through the common estimate of the output
gap (yt|t) which in itself is a linear combination of the initial estimates for all
the members of the committee, and (b) there may be strategic interactions
among committee members, in which case E(ωjt .ω
k
t ) 6= 0 for some j 6= k.
An important contribution of this paper is in understanding the nature of
cross-member interactions within the Bank of England’s MPC.
2.3 Recursive information processing
In the previous subsection the signal extraction problem was cast as one in
which individual members decide on their interest rate recommendation by
combining optimally the common and the private estimate (or forecast) of
the output gap. But it is also worthwhile to think of the process by which
the signal is extracted as recursive. In particular, the MPC meets and makes
decisions on a monthly basis. New information is analysed relative to what
was known in the previous month. This is because in each month the MPC
explicitly sets the interest rate at that level which it believes will achieve the
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inflation target 18 months to two years into the future. It must therefore be
the case that if no new (reliable) information is available about the state of
the economy then interest rates will remain unchanged. Moreover, given that
interest rates are only changed in multiples of 25 basis points, there has to
be sufficient new information to trigger a change. The uncertainty regarding
the new information and its likely impact on future states of the economy is
obviously an important component in the process of information processing.
Following Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005), we cast the problem of deter-
mining yt|t and πt+1|t and implicitly the uncertainty associated with forecasts
as an optimal filtering or signal extraction problem (Holly and Hughes Hal-
lett, 1989). A detailed derivation of the model is described in Bhattacharjee
and Holly (2005).
Here we simply note that the framework incorporates the time varying
quality and reliability of new information. The central point from the per-
spective of monetary control is that the usefulness of new observations on
the economy varies over time. In some periods there will be little if any
revisions to the optimal estimates of yt|t and πt+1|t, so a change in the in-
terest rate setting will not take place7. Information about the state of the
economy appears more or less continuously if we are observing asset markets
while other forms of information appear as discrete packages in the form of
flash estimates of GDP, full sets of national accounts and regularly compiled
forecasts.
We assume that this multivariate filtering is the domain of the Bank of
England and the MPC. However, we can also allow for individual members
of the MPC to optimally update their private forecasts. Assume that ςjt for
each member follows an autoregressive process.
ςjt = φj + θjςj,t−1 + γjt, 0 < θj < 1, γjt v N(0, σ2γt) (13)
and we observe this via
zjt = ςjt + δjt with δjt v N(0, σ2δj), (14)
where now z is a scalar. Then the optimal private estimate for the j-th
committee member is
ςjt|t = ςjt|t−1 + [σ2γt/(σ
2
γt
+ σ2δj)(zjt − ςjt|t−1)]. (15)
7It may also be that interest rate setting by the MPC is affected by the frequency with
which the central forecasts of the Bank of England are updated. The Inflation Report is
published 4 times a year in February, May, August and November.
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Of course, the revisions to private information will vary with the quality of
new observations. Further, because the optimal private estimate for the j-th
committee member also depends on σ2δj , there will also be heterogeneity in
the effect of uncertainty across the different members.
The standard separation of observation from control means that these
optimal estimates of yt|t, πt+1|t and ςjt|t can be plugged into the feedback rule
given in equation (12)8. This implies a decision rule for the j-th member in
the following form:
ijt = (πt|t−π∗)+φj+
1
αjβ2j
πt+1|t+
β1
β2j
yt|t+β
j
x
.xjt+β
j
σ.σγt+ϑjt for j = 1, ...,m.
(16)
The various components of the model have important interpretations and
implications:
1. The member-specific fixed effect φj indicates whether the j-th member
is a hawk (positive values) or a dove (negative values)
2. xjt denotes the indicators included in the j-th member’s initial estimate
of the output gap and βj
x
is the corresponding coefficient vector. There
is heterogeneity both in the choice of the variables and in their effects.
3. σγt is a measure of the uncertainty associated with future macroeco-
nomic climate and βjσ denotes the j-th member’s response to such un-
certainty. When there is more uncertainty regarding future (forecast)
output gap and inflation, policy makers will be more hesitant to raise
interest rates. However, different members in the committee differ in
their response to this uncertainty. In the empirical work for the MPC,
we use the standard deviation in one-year ahead forecast output growth
(from the output growth fan charts published by the Bank of England)
as the time-varying measure of uncertainty (σγt).
4. Finally, ϑjt’s are zero mean errors with a different variance for each
member. The magnitude of the variance reflects how activist a partic-
ular member is. For member j, ϑjt’s are uncorrelated across meetings.
8This separation also carries over to a more general model in which expectations are
forward looking (Pearlman, 1992).
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However, ϑjt’s are correlated across members — the degree of correla-
tion reflecting both the nature of deliberation within the committee for
arriving at a common estimate of the output gap, and the degree of
strategic interaction between members.
In contrast to the Federal Reserve9 and the ECB, where decision making
is by ‘consensus’, the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England
uses majority voting so it is the median vote that decides the outcome for
monetary policy. Votes cast by individual policy makers, usually in multiples
of 25 basis points, are published by the Bank of England. The decision that
is actually implemented, ∆it, is then a multiple of 25 basis points, and is the
vote of the median member10.
As emphasized earlier, there are three main forms of heterogeneity in
our model. First, members may differ in their views about the state of the
economy, and thereby differ in their private estimates of the output gap.
Second, there may be heterogeneity in the beliefs about how much effect
interest rates may have on future inflation and/ or output. And thirdly,
members may differ in their propensity to avoid changes in interest rates
given uncertainty about future states of the economy.
In addition, our model allows for interaction between the monetary policy
committee members, through information sharing over the decision making
process, but also by way of strategic interaction among members. In the next
section, we present our empirical model for monetary policy in the Bank of
England’s MPC in more specific terms, and discuss our econometric strategy
to uncover the nature of heterogeneity and interactions in the decision making
process.
3 Data, Empirical Model and Estimation
In the previous section we presented a model of committee decision mak-
ing based on an inflation forecast rule and accommodating heterogeneity
across policy makers and interaction between their individual decisions. In
9See Edison and Marquez (1998) for a detailed description of the decision making
processes of the Federal Open Markets Committee.
10Strictly the voting is sequential, where the initial options are to raise, lower or the
keep the interest rate unchanged. If a majority votes for no change there is no further
voting. If the vote is for a change, either higher or lower, a vote is then needed on the
magnitude of the change.
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this section we turn to an empirical examination of decision making within
the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. In the following
subsections, we present our data and the empirical model, and discuss the
econometric methods used to estimate the model.
3.1 Data and sample period
The primary objectives of the empirical study is to understand heterogeneity
and interaction in decision making at the Bank of England’s MPC, within the
context of the model of committee decision making presented in the previous
section. Our dependent variables are the decisions of the individual members
of the MPC. The source for these data are the minutes of the MPC meetings.
TABLE 1: Voting records of selected MPC members
Member Meetings Votes Dissent
Lower No change Raise Total High Low
Buiter 36 10 10 16 17 9 8
Clementi 63 14 39 10 4 3 1
George 74 15 51 6 0 0 0
Julius 45 18 25 2 14 0 14
King 85 14 50 21 12 12 0
Since mid-1997, when data on the votes of individual members started
being made publicly available, the MPC has met once a month to decide on
the base rate for the next month11. Over most of this period, the MPC has
had 9 members at any time: the Governor (of the Bank of England), 4 inter-
nal members (senior staff at the Bank of England) and 4 external members.
External members were usually appointed for a period ranging from 3 to 4
years. Because of changes in the external members, the composition of the
MPC has changed reasonably frequently. To facilitate study of heterogeneity
and interaction within the MPC, we focus on 5 selected members, including
the Governor, 2 internal and 2 external members. The longest such period
when the same 5 members have concurrently served in the MPC is the 33
month period from September 1997 to May 2000. The 5 MPC members who
served during this period are: George (the Governor), Clementi and King
(the 2 internal members) and Buiter and Julius (the 2 external members).
11The MPC met twice in September 2001. The special meeting was called after the
events of 09/11.
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The voting pattern of these selected MPC members suggest substantial vari-
ation (Table 1)12.
In order to explain the observed votes of the 5 selected members, we
collected information on the kinds of data that the MPC looked at for each
monthly meeting. Not all of this information is made use of in this paper
but the important issue was to ensure that we conditioned only on what
information was actually available at the time of each meeting. Assessing
monetary policy decisions in the presence of uncertainty about forecast levels
of inflation and the output gap (including uncertainty both in forecast output
levels and perception about potential output) requires collection of real-time
data available to the policymakers when interest rate decisions are made as
well as measures of forecast uncertainty. This contrasts with many studies
of monetary policy which are based on realised (and subsequently revised)
measures of economic activity (see Orphanides, 2003).
We collected information on unemployment (where this typically refers
to unemployment three months prior to the MPC meeting, as well data
on the underlying state of asset markets (housing prices, share prices and
exchange rates). We measure unemployment by the year-on-year change
in International Labor Organization (ILO) rate of unemployment, lagged
3 months. The ILO rate of unemployment is computed using 3 months
rolling average estimates of the number of ILO-unemployed persons and size
of labour force (ILO definition), both collected from the Office of National
Statistics (ONS) Labour Force Survey. Housing prices are measured by the
year-on-year growth rates of the Nationwide housing prices index (seasonally
adjusted) for the previous month (Source: Nationwide). Share prices and
exchange rates are measured by the year-on-year growth rate of the FTSE
100 share index and the effective exchange rate respectively at the end of the
previous month (Source: Bank of England). The other current information
included in the model is the current level of inflation — measured by the
year-on-year growth rate of RPIX inflation lagged 2 months (Source: ONS).
Our model also includes expected rates of future inflation and forecasts of
current and future output. One difficulty with using the Bank’s forecasts of
12For example, of the 45 meetings which Julius attended, the votes for 14 were against
the consensus decision, and all of these were for a lower interest rate. On the other hand,
King disagreed with the consensus decision in 12 of the 82 meetings he attended, voting
for a higher interest rate each time. Buiter dissented in 17 meetings out of 36, voting on
8 occasions for a lower interest rate and 9 times in favour of a higher one. See also King
(2002) and Gerlach-Kristen (2004).
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inflation is that they are not sufficiently informative. By definition, the Bank
targets inflation over a two year horizon, so it always publishes a forecast
in which (in expectation) inflation hits the target in two years time. To
do anything else would be internally inconsistent. Instead, as a measure
of future inflation, we use the 4 year ahead inflation expectations implicit
in bond markets at the time of the MPC meeting, data on which can be
inferred from the Bank of England’s forward yield curve estimates obtained
from index linked bonds13. For current output, we use annual growth of 2-
month-lagged monthly GDP published by the National Institute of Economic
and Social Research (NIESR) and for one-year-ahead forecast GDP growth,
we use the Bank of England’s model based mean quarterly forecasts.
Finally, uncertainty in future macroeconomic environment and private
perceptions about the importance of such uncertainty plays an important
role in the model developed in this paper. The extent to which there is
uncertainty about the forecast of the Bank of England can be inferred from
the fan charts published in the Inflation Report. As a measure of uncertainty
in the future macroeconomic environment, we use the standard deviation of
the one-year-ahead forecast. These measures are obtained from the Bank of
England’s fan charts of output; details regarding these measures are discussed
elsewhere (Britton et al., 1998). The forecasts of one-year-ahead output
growth and its variance show substantial variation over time (Figure 1).
3.2 The empirical model
We start with the model of individual voting behaviour within the MPC de-
veloped in the previous section (Equation 16). The model includes individual
specific heterogeneity in the fixed effects, in the coefficients of inflation and
output gap, and in the effect of uncertainty. We aim to estimate this model
in a form where the dependent variable is the j-th member’s preferred change
in the (base) interest rate. In other words, our dependent variable, vjt, rep-
resents the deviation of the preferred interest rate for the j-th member (at
the meeting in month t) from the current (base) rate of interest rt−1:
vjt = ijt − rt−1.
13We use the four year expected inflation figure because the two year figure is not
available for the entire sample period. In practice the inflation yield curve tends to be
very flat after two years.
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Figure 1: Variation in forecast output growth and its variance over time
Therefore, we estimate the following empirical model of individual deci-
sion making within the MPC:
vjt = φj + β
(r)
j .4rt−1 + β(π0)j .πt + β(π4)j .πt+4|t + β(y0)j .yt|t (17)
+β(y1)j .yt+1|t + β
(σ)
j .σ
¡
yt+1|t
¢
+ λ/j .Zt + ϑjt,
where Zt represents current observations on unemployment (4ut) and the
underlying state of asset markets: housing, equity and the foreign exchange
market (Phsg,t, PFTSE,t and Pexch,t respectively). Standard deviation of the
one-year ahead forecast of output growth is denoted by σ
¡
yt+1|t
¢
; this term
is included to incorporate the notion that the stance of monetary policy may
depend on the uncertainty relating to forecast future levels of output and
inflation. As discussed in the previous section, increased uncertainty about
the current state of the economy will tend to bias policy towards caution in
changing interest rates. In particular, this strand of the literature suggests
that optimal monetary policy may be more cautious (rather than activist)
under greater uncertainty in the forecast or real-time estimates of output gap
and inflation (see Issing, 2002; Aoki, 2003; and Orphanides, 2003). Since, as
previously discussed, the published inflation forecast is not sufficiently infor-
mative, we confined ourselves to uncertainty relating to forecasts of future
output growth.
However, there are two important additional features of our data gen-
erating process that render the estimation exercise nonstandard. First, the
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dependent variable is observed in the form of votes, which are highly clustered
interval censored outcomes based on the underlying decision rules. Second,
the regression errors are interrelated across the members.
3.2.1 Interval censored votes
Votes of MPC members are highly clustered, with a majority of the votes
proposing no change in the base rate. The final decisions on interest rate
changes are all similarly clustered. For the Bank of England’s MPC as a
whole over the period June 1997 to March 2005, 69 per cent of the meetings
decided to keep the base rate at its current level, 14 per cent recommended
a rise of 25 basis points, 13 per cent recommended a reduction of 25 basis
points, and 4 per cent a reduction of 50 basis points.
This clustering has to be taken into account when studying individual
votes and committee decisions of the MPC. We do not observe changes in in-
terest rates on a continuous or unrestricted scale, we have a non-continuous
or limited dependent variable. Moreover, changes in interest rates are in
multiples of 25 basis points. Therefore, following Bhattacharjee and Holly
(2005), we use an interval regression framework for analysis; other authors
have used other limited dependent variable frameworks, like the logit/ probit
or multinomial logit/ probit framework to analyse monetary policy decisions
(for recent contributions, see Chevapatrakul et al., 2001, and Gascoigne and
Turner, 2003). Our choice of model is based on the need to use all the infor-
mation that is available when monetary policy decisions are made, as well as
problems relating to model specification and interpretation of multinomial
logit models (Greene, 1993). We also explored a multinomial logit formula-
tion, and found the broad empirical conclusions to be similar.
Therefore, the observed dependent variable in our case, vjt,obs, is the trun-
cated version of the latent policy response variable of the j-th member, vjt,
which we model as
vjt,obs = −0.25 if vjt ∈ [−0.375,−0.20)
= 0 if vjt ∈ [−0.20, 0.20] (18)
= 0.25 if vjt ∈ (0.20, 0.375] , and
vjt ∈ (vjt,obs − 0.125, vjt,obs + 0.125] whenever |vjt,obs| > 0.325
The wider truncation interval when there is a vote for no change in interest
rates (ie., for vjt,obs = 0) may be interpreted as reflecting the conservative
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stance of monetary policy under uncertainty with a bias in favour of leaving
interest rates unchanged.
3.2.2 Inter-relationship between regression errors
As discussed in the previous section, the regression errors, ϑjt’s, are un-
correlated across different meetings for a given MPC member, but possibly
correlated across members. The degree of correlation reflects both the nature
of deliberation within the committee before arriving at a common estimate of
the output gap, and the degree of strategic interaction between members. We
represent the inter-relationship between the ϑjt’s as a cross-section (spatial)
autoregressive process as:
ϑjt =
X
i6=j
wij.ϑit + ψjt for j = 1, ...,m,
or
ϑt =W .ϑt + ψt, (19)
where ϑt = (ϑ1t, ϑ2t, . . . , ϑmt)
/, W is a (spatial) weights matrix with zero
diagonal elements
W =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 w12 . . . w1m
w21 0 . . . w2m
...
...
. . .
...
wm1 wm2 . . . 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
such that (I −W ) is nonsingular (I denotes the identity matrix), and ψ
t
=
(ψ1t, ψ2t, . . . , ψmt)
/ is a vector of uncorrelated errors that are possibly het-
eroscedastic with
E
³
ψ
t
.ψ/
t
´
= Σ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
σ21 0 . . . 0
0 σ22 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . σ2m
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
In combination with the regression model (Equation 17), the process of
error propagation (Equation 19) describes a model known in the spatial
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econometrics literature as the spatial error model with autoregressive er-
rors (Anselin, 1988, 1999). The elements in the (spatial) weights matrixW
describe the strength of interaction between different MPC members. The
purely idiosyncratic part in the policy reaction function of each member,
ψjt’s, are derived from the private and unshared information that each mem-
ber possesses. These idiosyncratic errors are uncorrelated across the members
and are allowed to have different variances for different MPC members; the
magnitude of the variance indicates how activist the member is.
We complete the description of the empirical model with a distributional
assumption on the errors:
ψ
t
∼ Nm (0,Σ) ,
where Nm denotes the m-variate normal distribution. Unlike standard prac-
tice within the spatial econometrics literature, the spatial weights matrix in
our case is unknown. The objective of the econometric exercise will be to
estimate separate policy reaction functions (Equation 17) for each of the 5
MPC members under study, and to estimate the spatial weights matrix,W .
The differences in the estimates of the policy reaction function across the
different MPC members will indicate the degree of heterogeneity and the el-
ements of the estimated spatial weight matrix will indicate the strength (and
nature) of interaction.
3.3 Estimation
3.3.1 Estimating the policy reaction function for each member
Under the maintained assumptions that (a) regression errors are uncorre-
lated across meetings, and (b) the response variable is interval censored,
estimation of the policy reaction function for each member (Equation 17)
is a straightforward application of interval regression. The interval regres-
sion model (Amemiya, 1973) is a generalisation of the tobit model where the
truncation in the dependent variable is possibly different for different obser-
vation units, and the truncation cut-offs are known. Estimates are available
in standard econometrics packages — we use STATA for estimation.
3.3.2 Estimation of the spatial weights matrix and error variances
In the literature, the spatial weights matrix is usually considered known a
priori. In our application, however, we wish to estimate the spatial weights
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matrix and use the estimates to understand the nature of cross-member in-
teraction.
Bhattacharjee and Jensen-Butler (2005) have recently proposed a method
to estimate the spatial weights matrix under a spatial error model with au-
toregressive spatial errors. Their method starts with obtaining a consistent
estimate, bΓ, of the cross-member covariance matrix of the regression errors
E
³
ϑt.ϑ
/
t
´
= Γ = (I −W )−1 .Σ. (I −W )−1
/
.
Given this consistent estimate of the error covariance matrix, they show that
upto an orthogonal transformation, the matrix
V = (I −W )/ .diag
µ
1
σ1
,
1
σ2
, . . . ,
1
σm
¶
(20)
is consistently estimated by the inverse of the symmetric square root of the
estimated covariance matrix bΓ1415. In other words, bΓ−1/2.T is a consistent
estimator of V for some unknown square orthogonal matrix T .
Suppose, we knew the orthogonal matrix T . Then, Bhattacharjee and
Jensen-Butler (2005) show that the error variances can be estimated as
bσ2j = 1q2jj , j = 1, . . . ,m (21)
and the spatial weights matrix as:
cW =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 −q21/q22 . . . −qK1/qKK
−q12/q11 0 . . . −qK2/qKK
...
...
. . .
...
−q1K/q11 −q2K/q22 . . . 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ , (22)
where the qij’s are the elements of the matrix
Q = bΓ−1/2.bT = ((qij))i,j=1,...,m .
14The inverse of the symmetric square root, denoted bΓ−1/2, is the matrix bΓ−1/2 =bE.bΛ−1/2.bET , where bE and bΛ contain the eigenvectors and eigenvalues respectively of the
estimated covariance matrix bΓ.
15Here, diag (a1, a2, . . . , am) denotes a diagonal matrix with diagonal elements
a1, a2, . . . , am.
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Typically, one would then require eitherm(m−1)/2 constraints, or equiv-
alently an appropriate objective function to fix the orthogonal transforma-
tion. Bhattacharjee and Jensen-Butler (2005) show that an useful set of
constraints is symmetry of the spatial weights matrixW . This constraint is,
however, not useful in our case since we expect the strength of interaction
between MPC members often to be asymmetric. For example, it is plausible
that an external member of the MPC arrives at her estimate of the output
gap quite independently of what an internal member does, while the internal
member may position himself strategically after assessing how the external
member is likely to vote.
We, therefore, build up an alternative set ofm(m−1)/2 = 10 constraints.
In the first instance, our constraints include
• Row standardisation: It is quite common in the spatial economet-
rics literature to work with a row standardised spatial weights matrix,
where the rows sum to unity. This, however, is not strictly relevant in
our context because some of the elements in the spatial weights matrix
could be negative. Instead, we standardise rows so that the squares
of the elements in each row sum to unity. This assumption gives us 5
constraints.
• Homoscedasticity: Initially, we also assume that the idiosyncratic
errors have the same variance for each member: σ21 = σ
2
2 = . . . = σ
2
m.
This assumption gives a further 4 constraints. The homoscedasticity
assumption may be too restrictive, and we relax this assumption later
on.
• We choose symmetry between the spatial weights for the two internal
members (Clementi and King) as the final required constraint.
We experimented with several alternative specifications of the 10 required
constraints and the above appeared to be a good set of constraints to start
with. The homoscedasticity constraint was, however, observed to be too re-
strictive. We relaxed this assumption subsequently, replacing these by suit-
able symmetry assumptions. In the next section, we discuss our assumptions
in more detail.
Having fixed a set of appropriate constraints, the problem is one of choos-
ing a suitable orthogonal matrix T . Jennrich (2001) has recently proposed
a “gradient projection” algorithm for optimising any objective function over
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the group of orthogonal transformations of a given matrix. The only con-
ditions necessary for implementing the algorithm are that (a) the objective
function is differentiable, and (b) there exists a stationary point of the ob-
jective function within the class of orthogonal transformations. The gradient
projection algorithm is simple to implement, once the partial derivaties of the
objective function with respect to the elements of the orthogonal matrix T
can be analytically written down. For some objective functions, however, this
may be difficult. In these circumstances one can then use numerical deriva-
tives to find the optimising orthogonal transformation (Jennrich, 2004).
For example, one can optimise with respect to the set of constraints pro-
posed above using the the objective function
f(T ) =
5X
i=1
q2ii +
4X
i=1
5X
j=i+1
qii.qjj (Homoscedasticity, 4 constraints)
+A.
5X
i=1
"
5X
j=1;j 6=i
qji
qjj
− 1
#2
(Row-standardisation, 5 constraints)
+B.
µ
q32
q33
− q23
q22
¶2
, (Symmetry, 1 constraint).
where A and B are fixed positive scalars. Note that, row/ column 1 cor-
responds to the Governor (Eddie George) of the Bank of England, row/
columns 2 and 3 represent the internal members (Clementi and King) and 4
and 5 represent external MPC members (Buiter and Julius).
The gradient matrix is then given by
df
dT
= bΓ−1/2.G,
whereG = ((gij))i,j=1,...,5 is the matrix of derivatives of the objective function
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with respect to Q, with
gii = 3qii −
5X
j=1
qjj −
2A
q2ii
.
5X
j=1;j 6=i
"
qij.
Ã
5X
k=1;k 6=j
qkj
qkk
− 1
!#
−I(i=2).
2B
q3ii
.q23.
∙
q23 − q32.
q22
q33
¸
− I(i=3).
2B
q3ii
.q32.
∙
q32 − q23.
q33
q22
¸
gij =
2
qii
.
Ã
5X
k=1;k 6=j
qkj
qkk
− 1
!
+I(i=2,j=3).
2B
q22
.
µ
q23
q22
− q32
q33
¶
+ I(i=3,j=2).
2B
q33
.
µ
q32
q33
− q23
q22
¶
and I here denotes the indicator function. The gradient matrix for other sets
of constraints can be similarly obtained.
Construction of confidence bounds and testing for the estimates of spatial
weights and the idiosyncratic error variances can be conducted using the
bootstrap16.
3.3.3 Estimating the cross-member error covariance matrix
The above method for estimating the spatial weights and idiosyncratic error
variances is based on a consistent estimator for the regression error covariance
matrix Γ = E
³
ϑt.ϑ
/
t
´
. If we had a standard regression model, we could
construct the matrix simply using residuals from the estimated regression.
In our case, however, the problem is nonstandard. Here, we cannot obtain
residuals in the usual sense, since the response variable is interval censored.
For example, suppose the observed response for the j-th member in a given
month t is 0.25. By our assumed censoring mechanism (18), this response is
assigned to the interval (0.20, 0.375]. Suppose also that the linear prediction
of the policy response, based on estimates of the interval regression model isbvjt = 0.22. Then the residual vjt − bvjt cannot be assigned a single numerical
value, but can be assigned to the interval (0.20− 0.22, 0.375− 0.22]. In other
words, the residual is interval censored: vjt − bvjt ∈ (−0.02, 0.155].
Given such interval censored residuals, we propose estimation of the cross-
member covariance matrix using the Expectation-Maximisation algorithm
16Bhattacharjee and Jensen-Butler (2005) propose a bootstrap procedure when estima-
tion of the regression model requires instrumental variables. In our case, however, the
bootstrap is more straightforward.
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(Dempster et al., 1977; McLachlan and Krishnan, 1997). At the outset, we
assign the residuals to the midpoint of the respective intervals and obtain an
initial estimate of the covariance matrix.
Given this estimated covariance matrix, we can invoke the Expectation
step of the EM algorithm and obtain expected values of the residuals given
that they lie in the respective intervals. For each monthly meeting, therefore,
we have to obtain conditional expectations by integrating the pdf of the
5-variate normal distribution with the given estimated covariance matrix.
Numerically, this exercise can be quite intensive. Instead, we take a sampling
approach by simulating a large number (in our case, 100, 000) iid responses
from the 5-variate normal distribution with the given covariance matrix and
a zero mean vector. We then take the average of all the responses for which
all the 5 random observations lie within their respective censoring intervals,
and proceed to the Maximisation step.
The Maximisation step is simple. The MLE of the mean vector and
covariance matrix for the 5-variate normal distribution is given simply by
the sample mean and sample covariance matrix. These estimated parameters
form the basis for the Expectation step in the next iteration.
This iterative process is continued till convergence. At convergence, the
current estimate of the covariance matrix is the MLE for the covariance
matrix of the interval censored residuals.
We can, then, use this estimated covariance matrix to infer whether the
errors are correlated across members, as well as use the matrix to estimate
the spatial weights and idiosyncratic error variances. Further, the estimated
covariance matrix can also be plugged into a GLS type procedure to ob-
tain asymptotically efficient estimates of the member-specific policy reaction
functions. We, however, do not take this GLS step because the interval re-
gression estimates of the policy reaction functions for the 5 MPC members
under consideration is quite satisfactory.
4 Results
Now, we use the methods presented in the previous section to estimate the
parameters of the empirical model, comprising the policy rule (Equation 17),
interval censoring scheme (18) and interactions described by autoregressive
spatial errors (19). The objective of the exercise is to study heterogeneity
and interaction in the decision making process within the Bank of England’s
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Monetary Policy Committee.
4.1 Estimated policy rules and heterogeneity
Table 2 presents interval regression estimates and goodness-of-fit measures
for the policy reaction functions for the 5 selected MPC members. The esti-
mates are based on the empirical model (17) along with the interval censoring
scheme (18).
TABLE 2: Interval Regression Estimates
of policy reaction functions for the 5 MPC members
Variables Governor Internal External
George Clementi King Buiter Julius
4rt−1 −0.119 −0.107 −0.101 −0.164 −0.226∗
πt 0.040 0.024 −0.050 0.051 0.110
πt+4|t 0.103∗∗ 0.110∗∗ 0.111∗∗ 0.258∗∗ 0.248∗∗
yt −0.016 −0.024 −0.052 −0.114 0.046+
yt+1|t 0.211∗∗ 0.223∗∗ 0.186∗∗ 0.216∗ 0.047
4ut −0.175 −0.244+ −0.216+ −0.645∗∗ −0.251∗∗
Phsg,t 1.760∗∗ 1.696∗ 2.355∗∗ 6.154∗∗ 1.323
PFTSE,t 0.620∗∗ 0.412+ 0.614∗∗ 1.229∗∗ −0.222
Pexch,t 0.003 0.009 0.007+ −0.006 0.004
σ
¡
yt+1|t
¢
−1.152∗ −0.420 0.378 −0.555 −0.981∗
constant −0.054 −0.795 −1.313∗∗ −1.803 −0.716
Number of meetings 73 62 94 35 45
Good. of fit Wald χ2 141.4 148.4 174.6 458.5 911.7
Prob. > χ2(10) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log pseudo-likelihood −37.98 −38.57 −66.17 −27.89 −11.70
∗∗ , ∗and +— Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
It is clear that expected inflation and expected output matter for the
interest rate decisions of most MPC members; currently observed inflation
and output play a much less important role. This confirms the assertion of
Section 2 that the Bank of England follows an inflation forecast regime. It is
also noticeable that unemployment matters for most of the members, as do
movements in the stock market and the housing market. The effect of the
exchange rate is, however, not significant. The impact of output uncertainty
is negative for all the members, and significant for George (the Governor) and
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Julius. Similar observations were made in Bhattacharjee and Holly (2005)
based on interval regression estimates for the aggregate monetary policy de-
cision.
More importantly, the results highlight heterogeneity in the decision mak-
ing process across the 5 MPC members. In particular, there is heterogeneity
in the individual beliefs on the effect of inflation on interest rates and out-
put. The estimates indicate that the external members (Buiter and Julius)
believe in a lower effect of interest rates on inflation, and Julius’s estimated
policy function also indicates a higher effect on output. Thus these 2 external
members appear to have a greater dislike for output loss than other members
of the committee. Similarly, substantial heterogeneity is also observed in the
perceived effect of unemployment, and of the stock and housing markets.
Further, Table 2 indicates heterogeneity in the effect of output uncertainty,
as well as in the individual-level fixed effects.
In summary, the presence of substantial heterogeneity in the policy reac-
tion functions indicate that monetary policy decision making within a com-
mittee is more complicated than what can be inferred from an analysis of
simple aggregate decisions undertaken in the literature.
4.2 Spatial weights and idiosyncratic error variances
As discussed in the previous section, we obtain interval censored residuals
using estimates of the individual level policy reaction functions reported in
Table 2. Using these residuals and an initial approximate estimate of the
cross-member error covariance matrix, we invoke the EM algorithm to ob-
tain the MLE. The iterative estimation procedure converges quite fast (in
4 iterations). The estimated covariance matrix and the implied correlation
matrix for the regression errors across the 5 selected members are reported
in Table 3.
The estimated correlation matrix in Table 3 indicate very high correla-
tion coefficients between regression errors corresponding to several pairs of
MPC members. This indicates that there is significant cross-member in-
terdependence. Estimation of the spatial weights matrix would facilitate
understanding of these interactions.
As discussed in the previous section, the estimator of the spatial weights
matrix consistent with the observed covariance matrix is consistent only upto
an orthogonal transformation. Therefore, we require several (10) restrictions
to pin down the appropriate orthogonal matrix. We impose these restrictions
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in several steps pogressively relaxing the more critical assumptions and at
the same time identifying restrictions that are consistent with the data.
Table 3: Estimated MLEs for Mean Vector, Covariance Matrix
and Correlation Matrix of Regression Errors (n = 33 months)
A. Regression Errors: Mean Vector (MLE)
George Clementi King Buiter Julius
0.0041 −0.0174 −0.0070 0.0016 −0.0054
B. Regression Errors: Covariance Matrix (MLE)
George Clementi King Buiter Julius
George .00829
Clementi .00923 .01031
King .00843 .00938 .00871
Buiter .00769 .00867 .00787 .00778
Julius .00106 .00112 .00108 .00058 .00050
C. Regression Errors: Estimated Correlation Matrix
George Clementi King Buiter Julius
George 1.00
Clementi 0.9989 1.00
King 0.9923 0.9896 1.00
Buiter 0.9573 0.9679 0.9558 1.00
Julius 0.5184 0.4934 0.5182 0.2965 1.00
At the first instance, we estimate the spatial weights matrix and idio-
syncratic error variances under (1) 5 row-standardisation restrictions, (2) 4
restrictions on variances implying homoscedasticty in the idiosyncratic errors,
and (3) a restriction that the weights between internal members (Clementi-
King and King-Clementi) are the same. Estimates under the above restric-
tions,however, indicate that error variances for King and Julius may be larger
than the other three MPC members. At the same time, estimates indicate
that some of the other spatial weights, particularly those between the Gov-
ernor and the internal members may be symmetric.
After experimenting with some other sets of assumptions, we finally pin
down an orthogonal matrix consistent with the following sets of restrictions:
1. Row-standardisation: Squares of elements in every row sum to
unity (5 restrictions)
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2. Homoscedasticity: Idiosyncratic error variances are the same for
George, Clementi and Buiter, and different and unequal error variances
for King and Julius (2 restrictions)
3. Symmetry: Symmetric weights between the internal members and the
Governor: wClementi,King = wKing,Clementi, wGeorge,Clementi = wClementi,George
and wGeorge,King = wKing,George (3 restrictions).
The estimates of the spatial weights and idiosyncratic error variances
are presented in Table 4. As one can see, the restrictions are approximatey
satisfied. More importantly, confidence intervals based on the bootstrap
indicate that quite a few of the spatial weights are significant.
As discussed earlier, non-zero spatial weights in our model are indicative
of (a) interaction due to deliberation and combined decision making within
the MPC, and/ or (b) strategic interaction. Of particular significance are
the negative spatial weights. While the process of discussion and agreement
to a common estimate of the output gap would contribute to positive spatial
weights, negative weights are almost certainly the outcome of strategic inter-
action. In this context, the negative spatial weights between the Governor
and the external members (Buiter and Julius) are of particular importance.
It would appear that the evidence from these estimates point towards strate-
gic alignment of votes within the MPC.
Table 4: Estimated Spatial Weights Matrix
George Clementi King Buiter Julius Row SS
George 0 0.642∗∗ 0.602∗∗ −0.284∗∗ −0.343∗∗ 0.973
Clementi 0.638∗∗ 0 −0.600∗∗ 0.261∗ 0.277∗∗ 0.911
King 0.618∗∗ −0.608∗∗ 0 0.265∗ 0.322∗∗ 0.926
Buiter −0.562∗∗ 0.562∗∗ 0.542∗∗ 0 −0.297 1.014
Julius −0.564∗ 0.564∗ 0.555∗ −0.249 0 1.007bσj 2.74e− 4 2.97e− 4 1.32e− 3 3.18e− 4 1.63e− 3
∗∗ , ∗and +— Significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
In summary, our empirical study of the decision-making process within
the Bank of England’s MPC supports the economic model presented in this
paper and indicates several interesting features. We find substantial het-
erogeneity in the policy reaction functions across different members in the
MPC. There is heterogeneity in the beliefs about the effect of interest rates
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on inflation and output, on the role of unemployment and asset markets, as
well as on the effect of uncertainty in the future macroeconomic climate on
interest rate decisions.
In addition we find evidence of interaction between the MPC members.
Such cross-member interaction is due both to the process of deliberation and
information sharing within the process of committee decision making, as well
as to strategic behaviour of the policy makers.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered committee decision making within a mone-
tary policy committee that targets the two-year ahead inflation forecast. Our
economic model suggests that we may find a wide variety of heterogeneity
across the policy makers. Our model also suggests that voting behaviour
across the committee may be interrelated in several ways. While part of the
interactions may be due to discussion and deliberation within the committee,
it is not unlikely to find strategic interaction between committee members.
Our empirical study of voting behaviour within the Bank of England’s
MPC provides good support for our theoretical model, and uncovers new
evidence on the process of monetary policy decision making. In particular,
we provide more extensive evidence on the nature of heterogeneity within
the monetary policy committee. Further, our empirical investigation of the
strength of cross-member interactions is new and provides valuable insight
on the process of decision making within the MPC.
Our estimates of the policy reaction functions of several selected mem-
bers confirms the common assumption that inflation forecast targeting is the
domain of the Bank of England. At the same time, unemployment, as well
as stock and housing market conditions have an important bearing on the
interest rate decisions.
Further, we observe substantial heterogeneity in the estimated reaction
functions across different members. In particular, the external members of
the MPC have a lower aversion to inflation, as compared to their dislike for
output loss or their preference for interest rate stabilisation. Different MPC
members also react differently to uncertainty in the macroeconomic envi-
ronment, to unemployment and to the asset markets. Such heterogeneity is
important in understanding the process of monetary policy decision making.
30
In addition, we find substantial interactions across the members in the
way that they vote on interest rate changes. While part of this interaction
can be explained by discussion and information sharing within the decision
making process at the MPC, we find evidence that some of the voting be-
haviour may be strategic. This issue requires further examination within the
context of appropriate theory on incentives and strategic behaviour within a
monetary policy committee. The emerging theoretical literature in this area
(see, for example, Sibert, 2002, 2003 and references therein) may provide
interesting new insights on this aspect.
To the extent that both heterogeneity and interactions reflect personal-
ities of the policy makers, it would thus be too simplistic to argue that the
monetary policy committee can be effective in taking personalities out of the
decision making process. At the same time, it is evident from our model that
heterogeneity across committee members has the advantage of providing op-
portunities to consider and debate a wide range of possible policy responses
to current and expected future macroeconomic conditions. However, we also
find evidence of strategic interactions between policy makers in the MPC.
This evidence would cast some doubt on the notion that committee decisions
enhance social welfare. Further theoretical and empirical work would have
to be undertaken before such welfare considerations can be rigorously made.
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